

MOTIA Final Conference

Rome - 29 March, 2012

DEVELOPING SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION FOR CIIP AND DEPENDENCY ANALYSIS:
QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

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ISSUE

Are there “laws of nature” in cyberspace that can form the basis of scientific inquiry in the previous mentioned fields (i.e. Critical Information Infrastructure Protection)? *Are there mathematical abstractions or theoretical constructs that should be considered?*



I will discuss this issue by making reference to the Internet infrastructure


HOW IS THE INTERNET 'GLUED' TOGETHER?

- ✓ Internet is currently partitioned into more than 40.000 Autonomous Systems (ASes) interconnected via the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) which is a critical protocols for the Internet
- ✓ BGP was designed long before security became a serious issue for the Internet



BGP retains a number of vulnerabilities

NETWORK ADVERTISEMENT




BGP FAILURES

- ✓ When BGP fails, portions of the Internet may become unusable, thus causing a loss of connectivity between critical portions of the Internet
 - ✓ E-mail, e-commerce, and Web accesses would be put out of service for a period of time ranging from minutes to hours!
 - ✓ BGP outages could be either
 - *widespread*, affecting large portions of the Internet (e.g. *route flapping*), or a
 - *targeted* against a particular network (e.g. *denial of service - DoS*)
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
ROUTE INSTABILITY

- ✓ *Route Flapping*: occurs when a previously advertised route is withdrawn and then re-announced repeatedly in a short period of time
- ✓ If route flaps happen fast enough the router becomes overloaded, eventually preventing convergence on valid routes



ROUTE FLAPPING WITHOUT DAMPENING

Route flapping behavior can *cascade* and deteriorate routing performance in many places



ROUTE INSTABILITY

- ✓ Route flapping can result in a denial of service (i.e. routers are flooded with more packets than they can handle)
 - ✓ The route flap *damping* (RFD) has been designed to prevent routers from thrashing while trying to re-calculate a large number of BGP UPDATES
 - ✓ However, both measurement studies and operational observations show that BGP path exploration can trigger false route damping which leads to prolonged periods of lost network reachability
 - ✓ As a result, many networks turned off RFD
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ANECDOTES OF ROUTE FLAP STORMS

- ✓ **April 25, 1997** - small Virginia ISP injected incorrect map into global Internet. Map said Virginia ISP had optimal connectivity to all destinations. Everyone sent their traffic to this ISP. Result: shutdown of Tier-1 ISPs for 2 hours
- ✓ **August 14, 1999** - misconfigured database server forwarded all queries to “.net” to wrong server. Result: loss of connectivity to all .net servers for few hours
- ✓ More recent events causing route flapping are reported in the Renesys Blog
 - <http://www.renesys.com/blog/2009/02/the-flap-heard-around-the-world.shtml>
 - <http://www.renesys.com/blog/2010/08/house-of-cards.shtml#more>

BEST COMMON PRACTICES AT WORK

- ✓ Comprehensive BGP security solutions have not yet emerged and current “best common practices” are somewhat
 - *overlapping,*
 - *confusing in scope and applicability, and often*
 - *neglect cost/benefit tradeoffs*
 - ✓ Many researchers believe that the Internet may be so hopelessly broken that it could be better to start over, rather than continue to apply band-aids
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LONG TERM GROWTH TRENDS IN INTERNET ROUTING

✓ Question 1

Will the previous problems be exacerbated when the Internet size increases, e.g. double in size?

✓ Question 2

Will the routing system be able to scale and meet the growth of the Internet and its ever-expanding level of demands?

✓ Question 3

What is the ability of the system to produce a stable view of the overall network topology?

SIMULATIVE ANALYSIS


- ✓ We can use simulation to evaluate a proposed BGP security solution before deployment

BUT

this requires an *Internet AS-Level topology* model

BARABASI-ALBERT MODEL (PREFERENTIAL ATTACHMENT)

The Barabasi-Albert model (green line) is not adequate to represent the Internet growth at the AS-level of abstraction



CONCLUSIONS

A new (more realistic) model is needed for getting robust results while simulating BGP security algorithms



Research is still underway